Thursday, May 26, 2011

Post disaster shock in a technoscientific society

At the same time as Japan is one of the most earthquake prone countries in the world, it is also one of the most technically advanced. When it comes to disaster preparation this combination produces a population that can be said to both be well prepared for a hypothetical disaster, but also very reliant and trusting in the ability of the government and the technology it possesses to protect it's citizens.


As we discussed in class, a deep belief in the safety and security of the institutions created to protect us from disaster can be a dangerous thing, if these institutions first fail. I can imagine that a somewhat dulled down (due to trust in safety measures) population will have potentially higher casualties if a really big disaster first strikes, than a population that has the mindset of self-reliability and preparedness.


In a country like Japan, the shock experienced in the aftermath of these kinds of disasters may be greater than in less developed countries, due to the fact that the people put a lot of trust into these safety institutions. In giving up our vigilance for safety provided by another actor, we have at the same time put ourselves in a very vulnerable position, and when we give these actors our blind trust and faith, the shock is even greater when we come to realize that they sometimes fail to protect us. Technoscience can therefore be a source of increased shock, when disaster first strikes. This shock is almost always coupled with the notion of blame in the aftermath of big catastrophes.

Monday, May 16, 2011

Blame cast in the aftermath of 3.11

Instead of focusing on a single case of post 3.11 blame, I will highlight a general trend of blaming met in a big majority of people trying to analyze what went wrong and what could have been done to avoid the nuclear disaster following the 3.11 earthquake.

This general trend I am talking about has to do with how people often follow the trail of money and the responsibilities (or rather the lack of) taken by people seen as in charge of the security and running of the affected nuclear power plants. Why did TEPCO ignore warnings of dangerously failing standards on their plants, and why did they not take into consideration the scientific reports saying that a tsunami wave bigger than five meters would cripple their generators? How can one in any case prioritize economical advantages over security?

In these cases, the accuracy of the claims may very well not be well documented, or true at all - this does not matter however, as their function is rather that of a highly effective fuel for the subconscious desire in humans to find some kind of scapegoat after a disaster that has ravaged the lives of so many. Instead of taking an introverted look on themselves and the the actions of the whole community before the disaster, these people rather demonize the people seen as in charge, asking themselves why they did not anticipate these events and take the necessary precautions.

In this particular case the people who are blamed will have a real hard time defending themselves, in much the same way as a security guard failing his duty will have a hard time defending himself. There is no denying what the job implied, or what should have been done in retrospect, but as is with these kinds of responsibilities, the magnitude of the "whats ifs" are not seen until the disaster has actually occurred, and one seldom gives any attention to the people in charge of these jobs until they fail to do their job. The big bosses and the people in charge of security at the plants may feel the blame directed at them to be unjust, as the discourse around nuclear security was limited at best before the accident, and the real attention was rather focused on the importance of saving money and giving a good public image. Although one was well aware of the dangers of nuclear energy, quick solutions to the increasing environmental problems were perhaps more important in the molding of public relations. When the general public, naturally followed by the government afterwards, demanded these peoples heads on a plate as a retribution for this "great injustice" done, it seemed fair, as these people clearly had neglected their responsibilities.

The restitutions demanded in the aftermath has been many and has ranged from the dismissal of the government, the firing of the TEPCO leadership and a discontinuation of Japans whole nuclear energy program, to more meager demands, such as economical fines.

This post was more of a meditation than that of a summary, regarding blame cast in the aftermath of 3.11 and I hope it was not to unstructured for you to get something out of.

Monday, May 9, 2011

Webpages I am following

Below are a list with short comments on some of the websites that I am following in my work with the group project in ANT352.


General page dedicated to all things nuclear - especially interesting history section

General Japanese news site in English

Blog regarding renewable energy and its many facets - critical to the impact on Fukushima on futere discourse

Two twitter feeds on the topics of nuclear power and nuclear reactors

Another general news page in english


Two pages concerning general scientific topics, with some interesting articles on both nuclear energy and the Fukushima disaster:

http://fairewinds.com/

http://ucsusa.org/


Please comment if you have additional sites that may help me.